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ETHICAL CONCERNS IN GROOMING THE
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT FOR THE
WITNESS STAND
James FarragherCampbell*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In this age of reality television, when just about any area of
endeavor is Monday-morning quarterbacked by talking heads of various
levels of expertise and vitriol, the criminal trial remains a front
contender, whether by virtue of celebrity or heinousness. From Phil
Spector's wig to Scott Peterson's suit and return to natural hair color, the
criminal defendant's appearance and demeanor at trial are the subject of
scrutiny and debate in the media.' The media's attempt to turn this into
"entertainment" belies the importance of the criminal defendant's
appearance and comportment at trial to the trier of fact, whether that be
judge or jury. And nowhere is the defendant's behavior more scrutinized
than when he is on the witness stand. Consciously or not, the jury
evaluates the defendant's demeanor on the stand and incorporates that
assessment into its finding of "credibility." How a defendant delivers his
testimony is often as crucial as what he testifies to. How does defense
counsel go about preparing her client for the witness stand?

* James Farragher Campbell has been engaged exclusively in the practice of criminal
defense since 1975. He served as President of the American Board of Criminal Lawyers in 2007. He
was a founding member of the Board of Regents of the National College for DUI Defense and
served as Dean of the College in 2000. He was awarded the College's Lifetime Achievement Award
in 2005. He is recognized by his peers as one of the nation's leading experts in the defense of DUI
and vehicular homicide cases.
1. See, e.g., William Booth, Phil Spector's Trial Goes on Location, WASH. POST, Aug. 10,
2007, at C 1; Susan Estrich, Op-Ed., TV Tryout: Scott Peterson Gets a Makeover, S.F. CHRON., May
11, 2003, at D3.
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PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS (OR, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD)

The practical aspect of preparing the criminal client for testimony
of course springs from two basic sources: First, acknowledgement of the
fact that, for the most part, the prosecution's witnesses have experience
and training in courtroom behavior and testimonial communication

skills. Most law enforcement officers receive training on how to testify.
They have been given courses on how to sit, how to address counsel, and
how to look at the jury when testifying.2 This training is then
supplemented by the sheer experience of doing it a number of times.
They even receive what lawyers could call "continuing education in

testifying"; that is, each time they testify they get comments on how well
they did, or how they may have faltered, so that next time, their
testimony is all that much better.

The prosecutor's forensic experts are even better than the police
witnesses. These are people who generally have received a higher
education, who have specialized training and who also have probably

benefited from a course or two on how to effectively testify.
Furthermore, as "experts," they get to enjoy special rules of evidence,
which the average lay witness is not afforded.3
The combination of training and experience is finally galvanized by
the patina which society bestows upon these witnesses: they are "law
enforcement," or "experts" called by "the People." All of these factors
help imbue the prosecution's witnesses with a certain confidence and

ease in the courtroom; qualities which the trier of fact may consciously
or subconsciously equate with credibility.
Contrast this with the defense, saddled with a client who has little
or no prior experience as a witness, who may have very little formal
2. See, e.g., Lynette Holloway, New York Police to Get Training In How to Testify, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 1993, at B1.
3. See, e.g.,FED. R. EVID. 701:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally
based on the perception of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the
witness' testimony or the determination of a fact at issue, and (c) not based on scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of rule 702.
See also FED. R. EVID. 702:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol36/iss2/4

2

Campbell: Ethical Concerns in Grooming the Criminal Defendant for the Witne
20071

GROOMING THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT

education and so be barely able to articulate the facts of his testimony, or
who, whether out of sheer terror of the circumstances he is in, or denial
of the same, testifies in a halting or annoying manner. To the "objective"
viewer, the trier of fact, the criminal defendant does not come across as
well and so is not believed. Is it solely because the testimony is not to be
believed? No. It is because the criminal defendant's obvious discomfort
and nervousness on the stand are perceived by the jury as indications of
guilt. Or, conversely, the criminal defendant's testimony comes across
so smoothly and glibly that the jury again reads these traits as indications
of guilt.
It is therefore incumbent upon defense counsel to try and level this
playing field. How far can counsel go in "grooming" her client for
testifying?
III.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

It is not improper for an attorney to prepare his witness for trial, to
explain the applicable law in any given situation and to go over before
trial the attorney's questions and the witness' answers so that the
witness will be ready for his appearance in court, will be more at ease
because he knows what to expect, and will give his testimony in the
most effective manner that he can. Such preparation is the mark of a
good trial lawyer, ... and is to be commended because it promotes
a
4
more efficient administration of justice and saves court time.
The difference between witness preparation and witness "coaching"
is that the latter implies conduct by the lawyer which "alters a witness's
story about the events in question." 5 In The Ethics of Witness Calling,
Professor Wydick assigns three grades to witness "coaching": The first
two involve a lawyer inducing the witness to testify to something the
lawyer knows is false, either by overt or covert means.6 The third
involves a lawyer not knowingly inducing a witness to testify falsely but
altering the witness's story by the very process of attempting to prepare
the witness for testimony. 7 To the extent the client's story is alteredby
any of these means, it "interfere[s] with the court's truth-seeking

4. State v. McCormick, 259 S.E.2d 880, 882 (N.C. 1979) (internal citation omitted).
5. Richard C. Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coaching, 17 CARDozo L. REv. 1, 2 (1995)
(emphasis added).
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id. at 4.
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function.",8 However, ethical considerations are not the same for each of
these three "grades."
"[A]n attorney may not 'counsel or assist a witness to testify
falsely."' 9

Under the federal perjury statutes, a lawyer can be punished for
suborning perjury if the following conditions are met: (a) the witness
testified under oath or affirmation about a material matter; (b) the
testimony was false; (c) the witness knew it was false; (d) the lawyer
induced the witness to give the testimony; (e) the lawyer knew 10it was
the lawyer knew that the witness knew it was false.
false; and (f)
If detected and proven, counsel may be prosecuted for the crime of
subornation of perjury which further subjects him to disciplinary action
since it constitutes12 an act of moral turpitude" and is considered direct
contempt of court.
Short of subornation of perjury, Rule 3.3 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct specifically proscribes a lawyer from offering
evidence she knows is false.13 The term "knows" means actual
knowledge, but a lawyer's actual knowledge can be inferred from the
surrounding circumstances. 14 The term "evidence" includes false
testimony of a client or of a third person, falsified documents, and
physical evidence that the lawyer knows is not what it is represented to
be.' 5 Similarly, Model Rule 1.2(d) states that a lawyer must not counsel
or assist a client
"in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
6
fraudulent."

Model Rule 3.3 commands that a lawyer must not knowingly:
"(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal or
fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made
to the tribunal by the lawyer; ...[or]

8. Id. at 37.
9. United States v. Rhynes, 218 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (1995)) (emphasis added).
10. Wydick, supranote 5,at 18 n.48 (citation omitted).
11. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6101 (West 2003); In re Jones, 487 P.2d 1016, 1022
(1971); see also, e.g., 40 A.L.R.3d 169 § 6(a) (Supp. 2007).
12. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Mun. Court of L.A. Judicial Dist., 60 Cal. Rptr. 575, 581 (Ct. App.
1967).
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2007).
14. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (2007).
15. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmts. 3, 6 & 8 (2007).
16. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2007).
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17
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false."
Comment 3 to Model Rule 3.1 states that "[t]he lawyer's obligations
under this Rule are subordinate to federal or state constitutional law that
entitles a defendant in a criminal matter to the assistance of counsel in
presenting a claim or contention that otherwise would be prohibited by
this Rule."' 8

A.

The Constitutional "Overrides"

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
a criminal defendant "the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."' 9 And,
this "assistance" must be "effective., 20 The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit the Federal government and the states,
respectively, from depriving any person "of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.' Consequently, the right to counsel applies
23
to the States, 22 as does the right against self-incrimination.
Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized other rights as corollary
to, and emanating from, those granted by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, including the right of a criminal defendant to testify in his
own defense. 24 However, this does not bestow upon the defendant a
constitutional right to testifyfalsely2
When the client invokes his right to take the stand, is defense
counsel "effective" if she allows her client to take the stand in an
unprepared state? This has nothing to do with counsel's duty to conduct
adequate investigation of the facts and law of the case, 26 but rather is
more akin to rehabilitating the client in areas of weakness before the
client even takes the stand. 7

17.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1)-(3) (2007); see also, e.g., In re Aguilar,

97 P.3d 815, 819-20 (Cal. 2004).
18. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 3 (2007).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
20. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984) (citing McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)).
21.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
(1999).

U.S. CONST., amend. V, XIV.

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963).
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964).
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49 (1987); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173-74 (1986).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 5 (2007).
See, e.g., Patricia J. Kerrigan, Witness Preparation,30 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1367, 1367-68

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 36:265

B. Effective Representationand Ethical "Grooming"
Can defense counsel ethically "groom" his client for testimony?
The result of such "grooming" is that, while it is the same individual
giving the same recitation of facts, they are presented in a different way.
Now, the client comes across as being more credible because, by using
different words to describe the same events, his version is delivered in a
much more powerful way. His appearance and deportment may allow
him to be more favorably viewed by the jury. If defense counsel has the
resources of time and money to allow for such preparation, isn't it in his
client's best interest to try and balance out the effectiveness of his
client's testimony vis-6-vis that of the prosecution's witnesses?
It is my contention that criminal defense counsel is mandated to
prepare his client for testimony as vigorously as possible and that the
only limitation thereto lies with the aforementioned proscription against
presenting false evidence. Anything short of that simply does not
28
interfere with the court's "truth-seeking function.,
Any degree of witness preparation will, necessarily, "alter" it. Even
a witness's unprompted retrieval of information from memory can be
shaded "by the witness's own experiences, outlook, and perceived selfinterest., 29 The very act of retrieving information from memory "alters"
it; for example psychologists who have studied memory have found that
when a person is asked to state all she remembers about an event she
might only come up with forty-five percent of the details but she will be
quite accurate about those details. 30 "Psychologists call that kind of
remembering 'recall." ' ' 31 If, instead, the witness is given a series of
specific questions about the event,
[S]he might be able to answer sixty-five percent of the questionswith
confidence, but her accuracy rate would be lower.Psychologists
call
this kind of remembering "recognition.".... A lawyer who needs both
accuracy and details should therefore draw on both recall and
recognition, 32and most psychologists recommend using recall first, then
recognition.
Memory has been "altered," but it doesn't make it less "true." To
paraphrase Shakespeare, truth is not truth which alters when it alteration

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See Rock, 483 U.S. at 63 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Wydick, supra note 5, at 9.
Id. at 42.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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finds.33 Similarly, a client's inability to recall a fact does not place
counsel in an unethical position because counsel "refreshes" the client's
memory: "An attorney is bound by the testimony of his witnesses and
there is nothing improper in refreshing their memories before they take
the stand. Reviewing their testimony before trial makes for better direct
examination, facilitates the trial and lessens
the possibility of irrelevant
' 34
and perhaps prejudicial interpolations.
Professor Monroe Freedman pointed out that ethical witness
preparation can also encompass the situation where the witness omits a
fact which can help his case.35 The attorney does not fabricate a fact out
of the blue, but rather raises the fact extracted from documents or
previous conversation because it has legal bearing on the case.36 The
client, who may not be educated about the law, has no way of knowing
that an item which he thought of little consequence was actually
potentially beneficial to his defense. Isn't this precisely counsel's role, to
shape the facts of the defendant's case around the law which best serves
that client's defense?
Take, for example, a client who was being prepared for testimony
in a vehicular homicide case which involved drinking. He tells his
lawyer that, "I only had two drinks." This statement is substantiated by
the credit card charge at the bar which defendant had visited earlier in
the evening. So, counsel assumes defendant will testify he had two
drinks. When asked on the stand, "How many drinks did you have?", the
defendant replies without hesitation and in one continuous statement: "I
only had two drinks, but they were doubles!" In this situation, the
surprise suffered by counsel at trial is reminiscent of Mark Twain's quip
that "'the difference between the right word and the wrong word is the
difference between the lightning bug and the lightning."' 37 How does
counsel avoid such lightning strikes in the future? Counsel, of course,
can be guided by this surprise in future witness preparations by
specifically asking the client whether or not the two drinks listed on the
credit card charge were "doubles."
If the client informs counsel (either voluntarily or through specific
questioning) during witness preparation that the two drinks he had were
33. William Shakespeare, Sonnet 116, in THE SONNETS 84 (G. Blakemore Evans ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) ("[L]ove is not love Which alters when it alteration finds.").
34. People v. McGuirk, 245 N.E.2d 917, 922 (1969).
35. Michael Higgins, Fine Line, A.B.A. J., May 1998, at 52, 56.
36. Id.
37.

RIcHARD S. LOWRY, "LIITrERY MAN": MARK TWAtN AND MODERN AUTHORSHIP 17

(1996).
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"doubles," can counsel ethically tell him not to testify to the fact that the
drinks were doubles? I think the answer is "no" because this is, indeed,
not presenting the true facts. But what if, in the same case, the defendant
tells his lawyer that he only drinks bourbon because he loves the "smell
and the rich brown body" of the drink. In preparing him for testimony,
can counsel tell him to drop the reference to his love of the drink; is that
ethical? My answer is "yes!" No dishonesty is presented to the jury.
Given the defendant's pronounced "love" of the drink, he might think
everyone shares the same feeling; counsel's informing him ahead of time
that not only is this probably not the case, but also that it will create a
detrimental impression on the jury, helps present the defendant in a more
favorable light while also averting opening the door to the introduction
of evidence on a collateral matter by the prosecution.
Another hypothetical case: A defendant in a murder case tells you
he has an alibi for the time when the murder was committed. He tells
you he was traveling across country to the opposite coast and so was not
in town at the time of the murder. Counsel investigates this claim and
finds out through airline ticket receipts that defendant's claim appears
valid, although some of the time elements are missing. Nevertheless, it
appears overall to be credible and is probably defendant's best defense.
However, another problem arises-he is charged for another murder that
has been joined in the same trial because of similarities in the execution
of the murders.
The defendant tells you he stopped off in Texas to see a friend on
his way and that this friend could come forward to alibi him. Counsel
determines this friend is not a good witness and appears reluctant to
testify for the defendant. Counsel learns the reason defendant stopped
off to see this "friend" was to threaten the friend's wife to accept a
property settlement that his friend wanted her to take.
Counsel advises defendant not to volunteer in his testimony that he
stopped off in Texas on his way back East. Counsel knows the
prosecution does not know about the property settlement threats made in
Texas. Counsel's decision not to have the topic brought up through
direct examination of the client does not change the historical fact of the
defendant's alibi; the defendant is not lying on the stand. Does this
"grooming" violate any ethical standards?
[D]efense counsel has no comparable obligation [as that of the
prosecutor] to ascertain or present the truth. Our system assigns him a
different mission. He must be and is interested in preventing the
conviction of the innocent, but, absent a voluntary plea of
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guilty ... [d]efense counsel need present nothing, even if he knows
what the truth is. He need not furnish any witnesses to the police, or
reveal any confidences of his client, or furnish any other information to
the
help the prosecution's case.... Our interest in notconvicting
in
the
worst
the...
State's
case
counsel
to
put
permits
innocent
38
possible light, regardless of what he thinks or knows to be the truth.
C. Implications of "Rehearsals"
With the proliferation of trial consultants, there is a concomitant
increase in rehearsing the client's testimony.39 While such "rehearsals"
may, indeed, result in a defendant more comfortably and persuasively
testifying on the witness stand, ethical issues also result.
First, there is the very real possibility that the defendant's demeanor
veers to the other side of credibility by his appearing too slick, too glib,
too rehearsed. Such a presentation may open up to the prosecution a line
of questioning regarding defendant's "preparation." Of course, such
preparation is protected by the attorney-client privilege, 40 but danger
exists that the prosecution can improperly ask defendant a question
about his trial preparation with his counsel. While the trial court may
sustain defense counsel's objection to this question, the jury hears the
implication of rehearsal and, from that, may make the leap to
"fabrication."
Another implication from "rehearsing" the client which potentially
arises in criminal cases is that, if the defendant is convicted, there is the
possibility that he will later try to leverage the length of his sentence by
"turning" on his counsel by insinuating that he was told by counsel not
only "what" to say on the stand, but also to "lie."
Often times, during witness preparation, the client is videotaped so
that he can also see how he appears while testifying. 41 Any tapes existing
from this exercise are, of course, protected from being turned over to the
prosecution by both the attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine.42 However, to the extent they offer exculpating evidence to any

38.

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-58 (1967) (White J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-1.2 (3d ed. 1993).

39. See, e.g., Nicole LeGrande & Kathleen E. Mierau, Witness Preparationand the Trial
Consulting Industry, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 947,960 (2004).
40. Higgins, supranote 35, at 54.
41. See, e.g., Kerrigan, supranote 27, at 1372.
42. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,511-12 (1947).
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charge of suborning perjury, can they ethically be revealed by counsel in
her own defense somewhere down the line?
IV.

CONCLUSION

I strongly believe that the criminal defense lawyer's calling and
constitutional mandate is to do everything within his power to prevent
his client from being convicted. There is nothing to apologize for or
back away from on that issue. The preparation of the criminal defendant
client for testimony is one of the major areas that must be pursued in
crafting the overall defense. Not to provide the very best of advice and
counsel on this point leaves your client potentially weak and vulnerable,
thereby failing to bring parity to the courtroom proceedings. When
defense counsel works to ensure her client is put in the very best light
while testifying, counsel is acting ethically and within constitutional
requirements.
Ethical questions will continue to morph as criminal trials become
more sophisticated, technological and accessible to the public. As
lawyers and courts wrestle with ever-evolving standards, one constant
remains firm: defense counsel's duty to his client. This actually is the
outside perimeter beyond which no one can go when evaluating
"ethical" conduct; while many gray areas may emerge up to that point,
they must always, in the end, be measured against this wall. A wall
erected by the Constitution and laws of this country and maintained by
the same.
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